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Abstract. This paper looks at the inclusion of excluded groups, notably the racial
transformation of the South African university system. Both demand-side factors — are
qualified black people hired as faculty? — and supply-side factors — are there enough
qualified black people who can be hired as faculty? — need to be aligned. Prior evi-
dence suggests that demand and supply both have both a psychological and a structural
dimension. Affirmative action-type regulations address the structural dimension of de-
mand, but homophily (a “love for the own”) can nonetheless limit the hiring of faculty
in white-dominated hiring committees. On the supply side, the weak education system
limits the structural supply of quality black potential academics. But the limited hiring
of black academics and resulting limited role models mean that few black people even
consider an academic career. This paper presents a model of hiring (either randomly or
on a homophilic basis), calibrated with data from the South African university system
from the end of Apartheid. Our evidence suggests that even a relatively small reduction of
homophily increases the rate at which the excluded group enters the workforce, and also
that the effects of homophily and feedback from previous hires are of a similar magnitude.
Nonetheless, the conclusions from the model suggest that the relatively long duration of
a research career and slow growth of the national university system will result in a slow
process of racial transformation.
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1. Introduction
The racial transformation of faculty is a topic that generates both public interest and
academic debate. In 2015 the New York Times reported on student protests in South
Africa, noting that at the country’s most prestigious tertiary institution, the University of
Cape Town, less than 5 percent of its academic staff was black1 — in a country where more
than 80 percent of the population is black. A few months later the Washington Post asked
about the US: “Where are all the black college faculty?”2 In this paper, we propose a model
to better understand the barriers to and enablers of the racial transformation of faculty.
We consider both demand-side factors: are qualified black people hired as faculty; and
supply-side factors: are there enough qualified black people who can be hired as faculty.
Evidence suggests that both demand and supply have a psychological and a structural
dimension.
This study focuses on South Africa. The South African case is an extreme one, but
it is believed that the insights from this context can provide useful insights for other
cases where minorities are seeking — often with limited success — to enter the academy.
In 1994, when Apartheid ended, the academic instruction staff across the country was
overwhelmingly male (69 percent) and especially white — 83 percent (Badat, 2010). This
was not incidental. A differentiated education system in which black people played a limited
role was key to Apartheid thinking (Reddy, 2004), and similarly, the transformation of the
education system, including the university system, was an important post-Apartheid goal.
This paper aims to understand not only to what extent such racial transformation has
happened or not, but especially why.
This paper focuses on the racial transformation of the South African academy without
suggesting that it is the only type of transformation that needs to take place and with
acknowledgement of the insights of scholars working on other types of transformation, for
example gender. In addition, the discussion of race is simplified to focus on whites and the
black (African) majority. We recognise the racial complexities facing two smaller groupings
in South Africa, mixed race (“coloured”) and Indian, and leave out their experiences in
order to present a more stylized argument.
2. Background
At the end of 2013, twenty years after a new constitution for South Africa was proposed,
white faculty was still in a majority. Although faculty were more representative of the
demographics of the country than in 1994, white males still predominated, with 55 percent
of academics male and 52 percent white. Moreover, black faculty were predominantly
found in the historically black universities that between them had less than 15 percent
1http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/09/world/africa/student-protests-in-south-africa-highlight-
dissatisfaction-with-pace-of-change.html?r=0, accessed February 15, 2016. In fact, the most recent
data on UCT indicates that the proportion of black faculty is less than 15 percent (not 5 percent).
2https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2015/11/12/its-2015-where-are-all-the-
black-college-faculty/?postshare=3881447437351744, accessed February 15 2016.
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white faculty and more than three-quarters African black faculty.3 But these universities
had only limited participation in knowledge production. At the seven universities4 that
deliver three-quarters of the PhDs in South Africa, 62 percent of faculty were white. At
the three most highly ranked South African universities, the Universities of Cape Town
and Stellenbosch and Witwatersrand University, the number increased to 70 percent.
In South Africa, the appointments of associate and full professors follow international
practice. Successful promotion requires evidence not only of teaching and service, but
also of sustained research output. In the more research-intensive universities, research is
concomitantly more important. But unlike in a region like North America, there is no
tenure clock — faculty do not lose their appointments if they fail to be promoted within
a set period. And numerous lower tiers (junior lecturer, lecturer and senior lecturer) are
available, where faculty can be appointed even without doctoral degrees. This practice,
together with the post-Apartheid commitment in South Africa to increase the intake of
university students (Reddy, 2004) has led to a situation where less than 42 percent percent
of faculty members country-wide have a doctorate.
Again, a pattern is evident. Less than 22 percent of the academic staff members at
the historically and still predominantly black universities have doctorates. This increases
to 52 percent for the seven universities that produce three-quarters of the doctorates in
the country while at the three top ranked universities5 62 percent of faculty members
have doctorates. Where black faculty members are present in academia, they tend to
occupy lower ranks. Prof Max Price, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cape Town
explained that many competent black students choose careers outside academia, limiting
the pool of possible academics, and also that it takes about 20 years for an academic to
move through the ranks to become a full professor.6 But a group of black academics at
his university pointed out that such views “shift the shared burden of responsibility for
crafting a transformed university community away from the university leadership onto the
institution’s constituents.”7
In order to meaningfully transform the South African academy in terms of its racial
composition, it is important to understand the current enablers and inhibitors of such
transformation. The next sections deal with demand and supply factors in transformation
respectively.
3The historically black universities are Fort Hare and Walter Sisulu University in the Eastern Cape,
Mangosuthu Technical University and the University of Zululand in Kwazulu-Natal and the Universities
of Limpopo and Venda, both in Limpopo. http://chet.org.za/data/sahe-open-data, accessed February 15,
2016. All data on the characteristics of the South African academia are from this site, and the most recent
available year (2013) used.
4Northwestern University, University of South Africa (UNISA), University of Cape Town, University of
Kwazulu-Natal, Witwatersrand University, Stellenbosch University and University of Pretoria.
5According to the Times Higher Education ranking 2015.
6http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/06/south-africa-race-black-professors, accessed Febru-
ary 15, 2016.
7http://www.uct.ac.za/dailynews/?id=8829, accessed February 15 2016.
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2.1. Demand for black academics. In the immediate post-Apartheid era, the then Min-
ister of Education S.M.E. Bengu was outspoken in his insistence that transformation of
the university system was an “absolute obligation”. Universities started various transfor-
mation initiatives, among which attempts to redress the paucity of black faculty members
in the South African academy. Affirmative action officers were employed, schemes to tar-
get potential black academics were instituted, and principles adopted such that if all else
were equal, the black candidate should receive priority over the white one, and that black
candidates with potential might be appointed on a lower rank than the advertised post
(Hugo, 1998). But Fourie (1999) pointed out that although formal discriminatory practices
were eliminated, many of the affirmative action interventions were informal, and that merit
remained the central consideration.
Affirmative action or employment equity programmes are structural attempts to shift
demand. Indeed, in his review of affirmative action studies in the US, Leonard (1990)
finds that one of the main consequences of affirmative action was a shift in the demand
for black and female workers in certain categories. But studies on racial transformation in
South Africa showed that the ostensible emphasis on merit by recruiters often hid racial
bias. Thaver (2006) identified four mechanisms that made it hard for black applicants
to be fairly considered for appointments and promotions. First, the racial composition of
selection committees remained largely white. Second, the criteria for selection were opaque
and subtly racialized. Interviews with academics at both historically white and historically
black universities lead her to conclude:
there is a racial conflation between on the one hand, notions of quality and
whiteness; and on the other between that of capacity building and blackness
(Thaver, 2006:30).
White academics often framed job requirements and suitability in terms of “universal” no-
tions of quality and standards, while her black respondents tended to relate their knowledge
base to their racial context. But although white academics invoked notions of quality, the
experience of black academics often was that quality criteria were applied inconsistently,
and that the third mechanism inhibiting black access to academia was that they were held
to higher standards than white candidates. Mabokela and Mawila (2004), focusing on the
interplay of race, gender and culture, found that quality standards (e.g. whether a can-
didate had a PhD or not) were applied inconsistently while Rabe and Rugunanan (2012)
found evidence that black women were able to get initial support such as bursaries, but
not permanent and senior positions in academia.
Thaver (2006) identified difficulties in doing research as the final mechanism preventing
the advancement of black faculty members. She repeated a finding from Fourie (1999),
that black faculty often had large teaching loads and struggled to find the time to do
research. Another potential barrier was that research was increasingly shifting from an
individual- to team-based activity, requiring of black scholars to access research teams. A
final consideration was principally epistemological. Black scholars found it harder to have
new areas of research accepted, and for example had to demonstrate greater engagement
with prior literature than their white counterparts. Ironically, even an area like “Indigenous
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Knowledge Systems” found greater acceptance when it was proposed by a white rather than
black scholar. She concluded that the opportunities of black faculty members were still
shaped by a “strong white power base of structures”. This was not necessarily visible to
white academics. In a 2009 study, Thaver found that black academics at a historically
white South African university experienced the existence of a strong but unspoken culture
that was white, male, Western and rational. In contrast the white academics insisted that
multiple cultures co-existed at their institution and that no culture dominated.
In 2005 in the US Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan proposed the concept of “implicit
discrimination” where discrimination is not only unintentional, but also outside of the
awareness of the decision maker. They argue that such discrimination is more likely to
exist when there is inattentiveness to the task (a situation that is unlikely to occur in
academic hiring contexts), and in cases where decision makers face a heavy cognitive load
such as working under time pressure, or when situational cues are ambiguous. They based
this assessment on a re´sume´ experiment in which they demonstrated not only labour market
discrimination against African-Americans, but also that better qualifications had only a
very limited effect in mitigating such discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004).
Already in 1999 Fourie recorded that the impact of the transformation agenda on white
faculty was “dramatic”, suggesting that the faculty who were hiring potential black faculty
members may well have experienced a high cognitive (and emotional) load. But although
the implicit discrimination argument essentially suggests that people will access the most
available stereotype, it does not explain why the stereotypes of another group would be
particularly negative. A suggestion of the underlying mechanism was offered in 2012 by
Jacquemet and Yannelis who replicated the earlier study with a third experimental group.
The fictional individuals who sent in re´sume´s to actual job advertisements either had
typically Anglo-Saxon, or typically African-American or recognisably “foreign” but white-
sounding names like “Dziella Lousaper” (2012: 7). They found that foreign re´sume´s were
discriminated against virtually as much as those of African-Americans, suggesting the
presence of ethnic homophily, i.e. that anyone who is not a member of one’s own ethnic
group would be treated differently.
In their review paper on homophily, (McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) dis-
tinguished between “baseline homophily” and “inbreeding homophily”. This reflects an
individualist versus structuralist (Mayhew, 1980) explanation for homophily, and is also
sometimes termed “choice homophily” and “induced homophily” (Kossinets and Watts,
2009). Essentially, two mechanisms are at work and indeed mutually reinforcing. The
first is an individual preference for one’s own racial group or gender. The second is the
path-dependent fact that individuals are already “pre-sorted” into shared environments,
and that those shared environments structurally constrain the choices that can be made.
To the extent that those shared environments are the cumulative result of prior similar
choices, opportunities to engage with people of different racial or gender groups may be
limited. Indeed, Kossinets and Watts mention “the prohibitive cost of searching for and
meeting” (2009: 434) people who are not in a proximate environment.
Race has been found an especially powerful divider of social worlds (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin and Cook, 2001). Moreover, under Apartheid, there was a comprehensive agenda to
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keep white and black people “apart”. Neighbourhoods, hospitals, schools, transportation
and so on were all segregated. Thus even if white faculty members were free of indi-
vidual homophily — unlikely, given their socialisation into a virtually exclusively white
professional context — they found themselves in a world of extensive induced structural
homophily. Although redress requirements attempted to shift demand, the countervailing
effects of homophily did not receive much attention.
2.2. Supply of black academics. In addition to the barriers that potential black faculty
faced in the hiring process, the supply of black faculty members — the availability of
people who want to and can become academics — was also limited by both structural
and psychological factors. A key structural consideration is the educational “pipeline” in
South Africa. Under Apartheid, the education system was racially divided, and there was
a deliberate underinvestment in the black sector with the argument (made by the then-
president, Verwoerd) that education would create false aspirations among black people
(Reddy, 2004). In contrast, the white part of the education sector benefited from extensive
investment. Redress, increased access and equity were critical for the African National
Congress when it came to power in 1994 but already in 2001, Gilmour highlighted how
trade-offs and the practical formulation of goals within the context of the highly uneven
schooling system were placing some policy goals in tension. Twenty years after the end
of Apartheid, it was clear that the vast majority of historically black schools had failed
to become places of learning (Sayed, Kanjee and Nkomo, 2013; Spaull, 2013). Parents in
historically black areas who could do so often enrolled their children in the more distant
previously white (or Indian or “coloured”) schools to realise better opportunities for their
children, further contributing to an unequal schooling system (Hill, 2014).
This meant that a large number of black students had been inadequately prepared by
the schooling system for tertiary education. The gap is already evident in enrolment:
68 percent of enrolled students at South African higher education institutions were black
whereas they comprised 80 percent of the population.8 Of the enrolled students, the success
rate was only 79 percent of black students versus 88 percent of white students . But even
the eventual success rate hides racial discrepancies. Only 20 percent of black students who
started their studies in 2006 completed their degree within the regulation time, compared
to 44 percent of white students. Thus black students were less likely to enter university,
more likely to drop out, and if they did eventually complete, more likely to take a longer
time to do so compared with their white counterparts — so much so that the Council
for Higher Education (2013:51) estimated that only about 5 percent of black youth will
succeed at higher education.
Pipeline challenges remain at post-graduate level. Herman (2011) argued that especially
good doctoral students were scarce, and that some institutions were recruiting doctoral
students from undergraduate level. But important considerations mentioned by Herman
are psychological rather than structural. Many potential black doctoral students did not
see the need for the PhD degree or indeed an academic career.
8http://www.dhet.gov.za/DHET%20Statistics%20Publication/Statistics%20on%20Post-School
%20Education%20and%20Training%20in%20South%20Africa%202013.pdf, accessed February 15, 2016.
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This relates to the notion of “perceived occupational opportunity”, a set of work that
evolved from the research that Gottfredson (1981) did on circumscription and compro-
mise. Essentially, people look at a known universe and pursue occupations if they see that
“people like them” are represented in them (Byars-Winston, Fouad and Wen, 2015; Chung
and Harmon, 1999). Mabokela (2002) reports that many black women in South African
universities struggle to understand the rules of the academic game not only generally (for
example, requirements of research in historically teaching-oriented institutions), but also
that women need to “constantly decipher new rules” (2002:193) specific to their institu-
tions. Her respondents repeatedly requested some form of mentoring so that they could
adequately locate themselves in the role.
3. Empirical analysis
We are primarily interested in the process towards equal participation in the South
African higher education sector. The empirical analysis focusses on the racial composition
of academic faculty in South African research universities, and how that is changed through
the hiring process of new faculty members.
In detail, we focus on i) teaching and research staff with ii) permanent employment
at iii) SA research universities iv) holding a Phd, and v) having SA citizenship (in the
following focal academics). This focus sheds light on that part of the higher education
sector where inertia of the past predominantly white system is highest, the career prospects
for academics are best, the signal of (non-)equal participation to the society of the whole
is strongest, and policy concerns are highest. Our focus on the integration of Blacks,
rather than Coloured or Indians, is justified by the fact that Blacks are by far the most
disadvantaged group considering their fraction in academia compared to their fraction in
the overall SA population.9 We exclude foreigners from the analysis because the societal
concern is equal opportunity among South Africans and not racial composition per se.10
The higher education data used for this analysis stems from the Department of Higher
Education and Training (DoHeT) of the Republic of South Africa.11 The data provide
for each (technical) university the number of staff members by various characteristics over
the period from 2000 to 2013. Sample restriction is based on nationality (SA), highest
degree obtained (Phd), having permanent position as research/teaching faculty. We are
9In 2011, the population (research university faculty) consisted of about 80 per-
cent (10 percent) Blacks, 9 percent (72 percent) White, 9 percent (6 percent)
Coloured, 2.5 percent (10 percent) Indian, and ‘others’ (2011 SA Population census
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census/census 2011/census products/Census 2011 Census in brief.pdf
and analysis data.
10The share of foreigners in research university faculties is about 25 percent while foreigners contribute
only 10 percent to non-research university faculty in 2013. Foreigners in research universities raise the
fraction of black faculty. In research universities, the fraction of black academics of foreign nationality
increased from 5 percent in 1994 to about 30 percent in 2013, while the fraction of black South African
academics increased from 1 percent in 1994 to about 10 percent in 2013. (Own calculation based on DoHeT
data, see below.)
11Made publicly available in a joint effort of the University of Johannesburg and the private company
IDSC, downloaded from http://www.idsc.co.za in September 2015.
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interested in the race, mostly the fraction of blacks, in the faculty and newly hired faculty
members in a given year. The employment commencement year of a focal academic denotes
the year when the person started to work for that institution potentially starting with a
non-permanent position which turned into a permanent one during the observation period.
We use the employment commencement year not only for the time of hiring decisions but
also to infer on the racial composition of faculty from 1994 to 1999.12 The overall analysis
period then starts with the first elections after apartheid in 1994 and ends in 2013.
The data entails in total 47 South African higher education entities. Between 2002 and
2004, during the restructuring of the higher education system in SA, 24 entities ceased op-
eration and 14 have been newly established. By the end of the observation period, 2013, the
data entails 23 entities, among which we identify 7 research universities. While 5 research
universities remained in existence throughout from 2000 to 2013, 2 research universities
have been formally newly established through mergers.13 We consider the merging entities
to be research universities but treat them as separate entities throughout the analysis.
This way, aggregate statistics for research universities are not affected by mergers which
redistribute existing staff among research universities. Disaggregated statistics on the level
of the university are mainly on the current state of the focal entity and hence are also not
affected by the restructuring in the mid 2000s.
Differentiating research universities from non-research universities divides the higher
education system into two parts of similar size. Both increased staff in permanent re-
search/teaching positions from about 2000 positions in the year 2000 to about 3000 posi-
tions in 2013.14 Growth is somewhat stronger for research universities and, consequently,
we observe more hiring decisions in research universities (2558) then in non-research univer-
sities (1791). The number of hiring decisions in the whole system varies over years between
150 and 400. The distribution of hiring decisions across universities is uneven. Large re-
search universities such as the University of Witwatersrand dominate the job market and
hire up to 45 percent of total newly hired.
Figure 1 presents the results of the analysis. The lines describe the proportion of black
PhDs over time, from 1994 to 2013, in three different populations. The lowest line, solid
with black squares, provides the proportion of black academics in research universities.
The upper line, solid with black triangles, gives the proportion black of PhDs that have
12We used another data set on the racial composition of teaching and research staff from 1994 to 1999,
obtained from DoHeT, to evaluate the validity of our approach. We found that while we fall short in the
obsolete number of staff due to retirements before 2000, the racial composition is accurate.
13The seven research universities are: University of Stellenbosch, University of Cape Town, University
of Witwatersrand, University of KwaZulu-Natal, University of Pretoria, Rhodes University, University of
Johannesburg. University of KwaZulu-Natal originates from a merger of University of Durban-Westville
and University of Natal, University of Johannesburg originates from a merger between Rand Afrikaans
University and the Technikon Witwatersrand. Technikon Witwatersrand is not in the data set but has also
not been a research university.
14In the same period we observe about 2000 entrants into research university faculty. Consequently
about 1000 should have retired. This makes sense when we partition faculty in the year 2000 into two
age cohorts (of 1000 each): young researchers from 35 to 50 and seniors from 50 to 65. By the end of the
observation period all seniors should have retired.
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been present on the South African job market but have been hired either by research or
non-research universities in the given year.15
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Figure 1. Proportions black in research universities among academics,
newly hired academics into research universities (observed and fitted), and
potentially hired academics.
The solid and the dashed line with circles describe the proportion black of those PhDs
that have been hired by research universities. While the solid line is observed, the dashed
line has been fitted by a simple logit model. The logit model takes the individual hiring
decision as basic unit of analysis. The modelled outcome is whether the PhD hired by the
faculty of a research university is black or not. In the model, that decision depends on
15We consider this variable as a proxy for the racial composition of candidates in the job market in a
given year. In case black PhDs are disadvantaged in the job market, the true proportion is actually higher
due to the possibility of not getting hired at all. The alternative would be to consider Phd graduates but
that suffers from the same issue with an opposite effect. If black PhDs are disadvantaged, they are less likely
to present themselves on the academic job market. Furthermore, there is an indefinite time lag between
graduation and entering the job market due to post doctoral positions which makes a difference during our
observation period when the proportion of black PhDs increased considerably. We did the same analysis
replacing hired PhDs by PhD graduates (with different lags) but obtained the same conclusions.
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the proportion black in the hiring faculty (ba) as well as the proportion black of poten-
tial academics (bp). The estimated coefficients along with p-values in parenthesis are as
follows:16
Pr(black academic) = logit
(
−2.9
(0.002)
+ 11.24
(0.020)
ba + 2.2
(0.352)
bp
)
The variable bp, proportion black among potential academics, is identical with the solid
line with triangles in Figure 1. We obtain for this variable a positive coefficient (2.2) which
is not significant and hence does not allow for rejection of the null hypothesis that the
hiring decision is unaffected by the proportion of blacks being hired overall in a given year.
The reason for the high p-value is the relatively small variation of the pool over years. We
emphasise that the empirical evidence does also not support acceptance of the idea that
hiring decisions are independent from the pool of potential candidates.
The variable ba, proportion black among hiring faculty, is positive (11.24) and significant.
The solid line with squares in Figure 1 corresponds to the weighted average of ba across
universities. The aggregate hides the fact that research universities differ considerably in
terms of racial composition. While we see relatively little change in proportion black within
individual universities, there are larger differences across faculty. Hence, the estimation
draws mainly from the variation of ba across university which creates 90% of the overall
variation of that variable.
In order to get an intuition on what the estimate implies compare two extreme cases:
the University of Stellenbosch with proportion blacks in faculty being zero in 1994 and the
University of Johannesburg with a proportion blacks of 18 percent. Fixing the proportion
in the pool of potential academics to 20 percent the former has a probability of hiring a
black academic of 8 percent while the latter has a probability of 40 percent (according
to the data Stellenbosch hired no black SA PhD until 1997 while Johannesburg hired 60
percent blacks — 9 black and 5 white academics — in 2011).
We note that the proportion of blacks hired by research universities always lies between
the proportion of blacks in existing faculty and the proportion of blacks in the job market.
The proportion of blacks hired into research university faculty can thus be expressed as a
linear combination between the two. B = hba + (1 − h)bp with 0 ≤ h ≤ 1. Solving for h
and entering aggregated data yields values between 0.1 and 0.9, interquartile range of 0.4
to 0.7 and a mean and median of about 0.5 with no particular order over time.
We use these observations for the model in the next section.
16We use the one-year lag of ba to keep the proportion of blacks in faculty unaffected by the outcome of
the hiring decision. The proportion black of potential academics, bp, can be safely assumed to be unaffected
by the individual hiring decision. However, all hiring decisions of one university might considerably affect
the racial composition in the pool. Therefore we remove all hiring decisions from the sample where one
university hired more than 20 percent from the overall pool. This reduces our sample for estimation by
884 to 1674 observations. The fitted line in Figure 2 is based on all 2558 observations. p-values have been
obtained from block-bootstrap with resampling on the level of universities as implemented in the function
‘cluster.bs.glm’ in the R-package ‘clusterSEs’.
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4. The Basic Model
Consider a population consisting of two sub-populations: there are academics A and
potential academics, or PhD graduates, G. The proportions black in the two populations
are ba and bg respectively. Each period one academic retires and is replaced from the pool
of graduates. We assume all academics and all graduates are of equal “academic quality”,
so their only distinguishing feature is colour.
There are two forces driving the model: the racial composition of the supply of new
academics, and homophily in the demand for new academics. In the model the academic
population is changed through retirement and recruitment. Recruitment is modelled thus:
an academic is chosen as the recruiter, uniformly at random from the existing academic
population. Agents have a preference for recruiting colleagues of their own colour (blacks
prefer to recruit blacks, whites prefer whites) but this preference may be stronger or weaker.
This is captured by a parameter h ∈ [0, 1]. When h = 1, homophily is perfect, so whites
only recruit whites, and blacks only blacks. If h = 0 homophily is completely absent, and
all recruiters are colour blind, simply drawing randomly from the population of potential
academics. In the simple, basic model all academics have the same degree of homophily,
h. With this process, the probability that the recruited agent is black can be written as:
(1) Pr(black academic) = ba (h+ (1− h)bg) + (1− ba) ((1− h)bg)
If the recruiter is black (with probability ba), with probability h he recruits a black and
with probability 1 − h he draws randomly from the pool of recent graduates, and gets a
black with probability bg. If a white recruiter is chosen, (1− ba), with probability 1− h he
draws randomly from the pool and gets a black with probability bg.
Each period one academic,drawn randomly from the current population of academics,
retires.
This describes a simple Markov chain, and we can write the elements of the transition
matrix. The total population of academics is fixed17 so we can work as well with the number
black in academia, denoted na which translates simply the proportion: ba = na/Na. The
probability that in a period the number of blacks in academia increases by one can be
written as:
(2) Pr(∆na = +1) = (1− ba)[ba(h+ (1− h)bg) + (1− ba)(1− h)bg].
This equation can be understood as follows: To increase the number of blacks in academia,
a white must retire, (1− ba), and a black must be recruited, which is equation 1, in square
brackets.
Similarly we can write the probability of the number of blacks decreasing by one:
(3) Pr(∆na = −1) = wa[ba(1− h)(1− bg) + (1− ba)(h+ (1− h)(1− bg))].
17The university system as a whole, including the formerly white research universities, has been exap-
nding since 2000. In the model development we ignore this, for the sake of simplicity. We explicitly include
it in section 6 below, when we calibrate the model.
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These simplify nicely:
(4)
Pr(∆na = +1) = f(na) = (1− ba)[hba + (1− h)bg]
Pr(∆na = −1) = g(na) = ba[h(1− ba) + (1− h)(1− bg]
which we can interpret as follows: Each recruitment is either homophilous or non-homophilous.
The former happens with probability h, and in this case a black is hired if (and only if) a
black academic is drawn to recruit (which happens with probability ba). Non-homophilous
hiring takes place with probability (1−h) and produces a black academic with probability
bg.
Equation 4 contains the basic elements of the transition matrix for our markov chain.
The transition matrix is diagonal, with the main diagonal being 1 = g(n) − f(n), the
diagonal below the main diagonal is g(n) the diagonal above the main diagonal being f(n)
and zeroes in every other cell:
(5) M =

1− f(0) f(0) 0 0 . . .
g(1) 1− g(1)− f(1) f(1) 0 . . .
0 g(2) 1− g(2)− f(2) f(2) 0 . . .
. . .
0 0 . . . 0 g(N) 1− g(N)

A closed form solution for the limit distribution is not readily available, but by setting
N, h and bp we can easily calculate the limit distribution as the first eigenvector of M .
4.1. Limit distribution. The limit distribution depends on the values of N, h and bg.
As might be expected, regardless of the values of these parameters, the mean of the limit
distribution is equal to bg.
18 The modal value, however, can depart significantly from the
mean. Figure 2 shows a plot of the modal value of the limit distribution versus the degree
of homophily. In this example, the proportion black in the overall population is 90 percent.
The mean value of the limit distribution is also 450 black academics in a population of 500,
or 90 percent, as one would expect. However, it is clearly the case that as the degree of
homophily increases, the modal value of the distribution departs quite radically from the
mean value.19 We observe significant over-shooting. While, if we observe over a long enough
time, the mean value of blacks in academia will equal the proportion in the population,
at any time we are more likely to observe blacks over-represented in academia, as we are
more likely to observe the modal value than any other. And this over-representation can
be quite severe if homophily is high.
4.2. Transition dynamics. More interesting perhaps than the limit distribution, are the
transition dynamics from the initial state towards that limit. In this simple model we
present the transition dynamics through the iteration of the markov chain transition matrix
(equation 5). This is shown in Figure 3. We assume an initial state in which ninety percent
18This is not true when homophily is equal to 1. In this case the system has two absorbing states:
academia is either all white or all black. If, however, homophily is strictly less then one, the intuition holds.
19Again assuming homophily is strictly less then one.
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Figure 2. Modal values of the limit distribution, changing with degree of
homophily h. Population size 500, proportion black in the pool of PhD
graduates 90 percent.
of the academic population is white. In the population as a whole, the proportion black
is unchanged over time at bp = 0.9. As the transition matrix is iterated it shows the
probability distribution of being in any state (proportion white in academia) in the periods
as time passes.
For smaller values of homophily the mean and mode of the distribution stay close to-
gether and converge relatively rapidly to the proportion black in the general population.
For larger values of homophily, it takes much longer for the mean to approach the general
population, and, equally striking, is that the variance of observed states increases dramat-
ically. When homophily is very high, it is very difficult to predict what sort of path the
system will take to its long run steady state distribution. But more striking is that the
mean and mode depart from each other, the mode being larger than the mean. This is
consistent with the result shown in Figure 2. When homophily is very high, the divergence
between mean and mode happens very suddenly.
4.3. Evolving pool of potential academics. The analysis above has assumed that the
proportion of blacks in the pool of potential academics is constant over time. To represent
the South African case a little more closely, on top of the described endogenous change in
the population of academics, we superimpose an exogenous change in the population or pool
of potential academics, G. Various policy measures have implied that the pool of potential
academics is shifting away from being predominantly white, with the goal of becoming
more and more representative of the population as a whole, that is, predominantly non-
white. To capture this effect we model the proportion black in the population of potential
PhD students P, bg, as a function of time, t:
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Figure 3. Distribution of possible states in the evolution of the model
starting at ba = 0.1, with bg = 0.9. The horizontal axis is time; the vertical
axis is number of blacks in academia (total size of academia is 500 people).
Darker shades of grey indicate higher probabilities. The white curve rep-
resents the mean of the distribution, black is the mode, at each point in
time. The four panels represent 4 values for h. Clockwise from the top left:
h = 0.99, h = 0.85, h = 0, h = 0.5. Notice the different time scales.
(6) bg = 0.1 + 0.7 ∗
(
1− 0.8
1 + exp(−100(500− t)
)
,
which starts at bg = 0.1 and has a maximum value of bg = 0.8, with the mid point occurring
after 500 hires (which, at 25 hires per year (5 % of the size of academia), makes 20 years.
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Figure 4. Time series of the proportion black in academia for 4 different
values of homophily, h = 0.99, h = 0.85, h = 0.5, h = 0. Black dashed
curves are the exogenously evolving proportion black in the pool; white
curves are mean values, and black solid curves are 5 and 95% confidence
intervals. The abscissa is measured in terms of hiring events. With a
population of 500, and a retirement rate of 5% per year, one calendar year
contains 25 hiring events.
This results in the patterns shown in Figure 4. Each panel shows the results of 800
runs of the model. A panel should be read as a relief map, with darker greys indicat-
ing more frequent observations over the 800 replications. The white curve is the median
observation, the two thin black curves 5 and 95 percentiles; and the dashed black curve
shows the proportion black in the pool of graduates. What we observe is consistent with
Figure 3. With zero homophily, the composition of academia tracks relatively closely the
composition of the population. What is somewhat striking is that this is true even when 85
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percent of recruiting is homophilous. So even a relatively small amount of “colour-blind”
hiring is enough to make academia track the population. This points to the importance of
the composition of the pool of potential academics as one very important element of the
integration process.
4.4. Feedback. As discussed above, the racial composition of the pool of potential aca-
demics is likely not to be independent of the racial composition of academics.20 Schemat-
ically, Master’s graduates who consider opening the academic career path by starting a
PhD decide whether it is a sensible option based on whether people “like them” succeed in
this career trajectory.21 Thus while the secular trend we introduced in the previous section
might well capture the effects of policy on Bachelor or Masters graduates, the evolution of
PhD graduates (from which academia recruits) may not be so simple.
We add a feedback to the model, wherein the proportion black in the pool of potential
academics is a linear combination of the secular trend of highly educated students, H, in
which the proportion black is bh, and the current academic population:
(7) bgt = αbat + (1− α)bht.
We set α = 0.8.
The effect is shown in Figure 5. In each panel the thick black dashed curve represents
the exogenously (to the model) determined pool of Masters graduates who might consider
doing a PhD to follow an academic career. The white curve is the mean (over 800 runs)
of the proportion, ba the proportion black in academia in each period, solid black curves
are 5 and 95 percent confidence intervals. The thin dashed black curve is the pool of PhD
graduates bg from which academics can be recruited.
What is clear is that this feedback can have a strong effect in delaying the transition. This
is consistent with prior work finding that feedback effects can help entrench discrimination
(Anderson, Fryer and Holt, 2006). When blacks perceive academia as a “white profession”,
and so do not even present themselves as candidates, even with small values of homophily,
the composition of academia remains very different from that of “masters graduates” for a
very long time. It does eventually fall to look like the global population (indeed the mean
of the limit distribution in this case is the proportion black in the population) but this can
take a very long time. To illustrate the importance of this effect, Figure 6 presents two
extreme cases: the left panel shows the simpler model with some amount of homophilous
hiring but no feedback from academia to career choice; in the right panel all recruitment
is colour-blind, but there is feedback from academia to career choice.
To the eye these panels are indistinguishable, and the clear observation here is that these
two effects: homophilous hiring, or feedback from academia to career choice, can have very
similar effects on the transition from a predominantly white academia to one that reflects
the racial composition of the general population.
20This is an observation that is also often made in the context of women in the labour force generally,
and in academic science in particular.
21Of course, academia is not unusual in this respect.
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Figure 5. Time series of the proportion black in academia for 4 different
values of homophily, h = 0.99, h = 0.95, h = 0.85, h = 0.5. Thick black
dashed curve — exogenous pool of Master graduates; thin black dashed
curve — pool of PhD graduates; white curve — mean over 800 runs of
proportion black in academia; solid black curves — 5 and 95% confidence
intervals.
5. Endogenous Homophily
To this point, the model has been structured at a very aggregate level, effectively treat-
ing academia as one monolithic entity. This is obviously a simplification — academia is
disaggregated at many levels: universities, faculties, departments, disciplines and subdis-
ciplines and so on. This disaggregation is particularly important in the context of South
African history where there under apartheid the university system was as segregated as
the rest of society. There were black universities and white universities, the two groups
having little interaction, and very different treatments under education policy. Since the
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Figure 6. Time series of the number black in academia, with a total pop-
ulation of 500. Left panel, no feedback, h = 0.82; right panel, feedback
α = 0.8 with no homophily (h = 0). Shades of grey indicate probability of
observing a state: darker greys indicate higher probabilities. Grey dots are
the mean value; black dots the modal value; black curves are 1, 5, 95 and
99 % confidence intervals.
end of the apartheid era there have been major structural reforms aimed at undoing this
legacy, but nonetheless, vestiges of it remain, and can be seen when disaggregating to the
university level.
To capture some of this we do a similar disaggregation to the model, breaking academia
up into separate institutions. This disaggregation permits addition of one more feature to
the model, namely that homophily could evolve, even at the level of the individual.22 To
introduce this we assume that retiring and hiring takes place at the institution level: When
a person retires, he or she is replaced in the same institution. Further, if a (black) white is
hired into an institution, we assume that the experience is a good one, and that all white
(black) members of that institution become less homophilous in their recruiting. This
has the effect of making the process non-Markovian, so we move directly to a numerical
implementation.
We assume a population of 500 academics, divided into 20 equal-sized institutions. Ho-
mophily is defined at the individual level and evolves over time. Each period one (randomly
chosen, probabilistically according to age) academic retires. He or she is replaced so his or
her institution remains the same size. The replacement follows precisely the same process
as in the basic model, the refinement being that the recruiter is in the same institution
as the retiree. If the new recruit is (non-)white, the homophily of the whites(non-whites)
in the institution changes according to h′ij = βhij , where β < 1, i ∈ {white, non-white}
22Cite Chapter 3 by Kuklinski and Cobb, in a book on racial attitudes here.
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Figure 7. Distribution of proportion black in academia of observed evo-
lution of 800 runs. Darker grey points indicate more frequently observed
values of ba. Smooth dashed black curve: secular trend of potential people
seeking academic career (same for every run of the model); falling black
curve is average homophily level averaged over 800 runs at each point in
time; jagged dashed black curve is PhD graduates averaged over 800 runs
at each point in time.
and j is the institution in which retirement and recruitment take place. (In the numeri-
cal treatment below, we set β = 0.75.) Evolution of the pool of graduates takes place as
above, including feedback from the composition of academia to the composition of the pool
of potential recruitees. We initialize the system so that the system as a whole contains ten
percent blacks at the start.
Figure 7 shows the evolution of 800 runs of this system over 25000 periods. This is again
to be read as a relief map: darker shades of grey indicate a more frequently observed value
from the proportion black in academia at the given time period. The white curve is the
median value; dashed black curves are 95 percent confidence intervals. The jagged black
dashed line is the proportion black in the PhD graduate pool. The falling black curve is
the average homophily level in the academic population.
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What we can observe in this figure is that homophily falls quickly relative to the rate
at which the system integrates.23 The second thing to observe is that the actual pool of
recruitees (jagged dashed black curve) lags significantly behind the secular trend of the
population that might consider an academic career (smooth dashed black curve), due to
the feedback between current composition of academia and its perceived attractiveness to
different races. Finally, we observe that the average behaviour of the system tracks very
closely the average behaviour of the population of PhD graduates. That is, the composition
of academia lags the composition of PhD graduates by a relatively small number of periods.
There will of course always be some lag, as the existing population of academics must age
and retire, but in what we see here the lag is relatively short.
6. Calibration
Using the empirical analysis in Section 3 above, we can calibrate this model to the current
and recent past situation in South Africa. For this exercise we restrict our attention to
the evolution of the 7 “formerly white research-oriented universities” in South Africa, and
consider only students and faculty members with South African citizenship. We use the
model as presented in Section 4.4, that is, we include feedback from academia to the pool
of potential academics, but do not include endogenous homophily. The reason is simply
that we have no way of estimating that effect.
To recapitulate, there is a population of academics A, which includes nb blacks (forming
ba percent of the population). There is a population of potential academics, G, of which
bg percent is black. There is a population of “highly educated” students, H, who could
consider a career in academia, the proportion black therein being bh.
From the data, our estimates of retirement and hiring are that roughly 4 percent of the
academic population retires and a number equivalent to 6 percent of the population is hired
each year. This makes for an annual growth rate of 2 percent. We assume that continues
for 50 years.
Our analysis, and so the calibration, has been restricted to what are known as the
research-oriented universities, and this growth assumption refers to them. Practically,
though, an obvious possibility would be from the government to expand the university
system as a whole leaving the growth rate of the research universities as it is, with the
intention of maintaining “quality” in those institutions. This would create a bigger pool
of potential academics who would have posts in the less research oriented universities but
might shift into the research ones. The evidence on the plausibility of such an intermediary
strategy is not available, unfortunately, and one can only ask how many academics have
been appointed at the “best” universities from those lower in the pecking order.
Estimates of homophily in hiring are that our parameter h = 0.5.24
23Of course precisely how fast homophily falls will be determined by the value of β we set, but the
observation that it falls fast relative to other quantities in the model remains except for β values very close
to one.
24This estimate says nothing about the source of homophily, though we note that in making it we are
assuming that homophily does not evolve over the period. The latter is probably incorrect, but we have no
data with which to incorporate endogenous homophily into the calibration.
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To estimate the composition of the pool of potential academics, we use all South African
PhD graduates hired into the entire university system (encompassing both research uni-
versities, other universities and technikons). For the secular trend of “highly educated”,
we use Honour’s graduates with South African nationality.25
Assuming a logistic growth curve, we estimate the secular trend in the proportion black
as bh = (0.8− 0.263) ∗ (1/(1 + exp(2.084− 0.113× t))), where the ceiling of 0.8 is assumed
to be the population share and the floor of 0.263 is the proportion black in the first year
of observation, 1994.26
Our parameter α in equation 7 we estimate to be α = 0.5, assuming a time lag of seven
years between obtaining an Honour degree and being hired into faculty.
With these estimates we can simulate the model, and perform policy experiments. Figure
8 projects the transition for the next 250 years based on these estimates.27 What we observe
is a significant lag between the pool of potential academics and those finishing a PhD. This
lag is largely driven by the feedback from the composition of academia to the decision to
follow an academic career (parameter α). These is also a lag between the pool of potential
academics and academia itself. This lag has two sources, homophiliy in hiring (h), and
simply the duration of an academic career — to effect transformation through retirements
and recruitments, many (white) people must retire to make way for new (black) people.
Since an academic career lasts roughly 35 years, this will necessarily be a slow process.
In figure 9 we show the effects of eliminating homophily, and eliminating the feedback
from academia to the pool. The latter implies that all “highly educated”, the composition
of which is driven by a secular trend, go on to become potential academics. The base case is
in the top left panel. What we observe is that eliminating homophily in hiring (bottom left
panel) or eliminating demonstration effects in the decision to pursue an academic career
(top right panel), have roughly the same effects. Each reduces the time to transformation by
between 25 and 50 percent.28 If we eliminate both (bottom right panel) time to complete
transformation is reduced by roughly 75 percent, here being driven by two forces, the
exogenous supply of highly educated South Africans, and the time it takes to turn over the
stock of academics.
Finally we make one more set of experiments. We change the secular trend to the most
optimistic possible, namely that starting immediately, the racial composition of the pool
25The South African Honour degree is a post-graduate degree following the Bachelor, and giving admis-
sion to Master studies. We prefer using the racial composition of Honour graduates over Bachelor graduates
because most Bachelor studies in South Africa are vocationally oriented and often do not permit transition
to more academic Master studies. On the other hand, the proportion black among Honour’s graduates is
relatively high compared to that among Master graduates while (time-lagged) proportions appear stable
from Master over PhD up to the job market for faculty members.
26This estimate should be treated very carefully, as we are estimating a curve that spans 100 years based
on the first 20 observations.
27With these parameters, and in particular with low h, there is little variation from run to run, so we
show only the results of a single run of the model.
28Because of the randomness in the process, we cannot say exactly how many years the transformation
will take. In the base case it appears to be roughly 200 years; in either of these two cases it appears to be
between 100 and 150 years.
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Figure 8. Evolution of academia under estimated parameter values.
of highly educated reflects the racial composition of the population as a whole, namely
80 percent black. This is shown in figure 10. What we observe here is consistent with
the patterns in Figure 9: homophily and demonstration effects are roughly similar in
magnitude, and with neither in operation the transformation will take roughly 40 years.
The calibrated model produces very long transition times. In that regard several things
should be observed. The first is that of necessity, the values we estimated to use in the base
case are derived from the data we have at hand. These data come from the period 1995-
2013. It is well-known that to estimate a logistic curve based on the first 20 observations
is fraught with peril. Thus the “exogenous” transition of the basic pool could be faster
than we have estimated. This will reduce the time to transformation accordingly. Second,
the estimates of the feedback effect, α, and homophily h are derived from annual data on
hiring, and the composition the academy. These estimates vary considerably from year to
year, and we have simply chosen an approximate mid-point of the 20 values for each of
these parameters we estimated. With so few points it is difficult to give reliable confidence
intervals on these parameter estimates, but the experiments shown in Figures 9 and 10
give a reasonably reliable indication about how the process would be sped up if feedback
and homophily were less strong than we have estimated.
Finally, there are likely other factors that can affect the decision to pursue an academic
career — to move from “highly educated” to “potential academic” — such as the social
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Figure 9. Evolution of academia under estimated parameter values, and
three sets of alternative values.
and financial obligations that skilled black South Africans often have to an extended family
(Chipkin and Ngqulunga, 2008). The socio-economic background of black students differs
systematically from that of white students. Black students tend to come from a poorer
environment where it takes a sacrifice of many to support the studies of one person. Obli-
gations accumulate during study, and create a strong pressure to earn a salary as soon
as possible in order to provide financial support to those socially close; a phenomenon
popularly coined as the “black tax”.
While the evolution of such structural factors is certainly critical to the transformation
of the higher education system, we focus in our model deliberately on endogenous forces
within the higher education system. Structural factors (exogenous to the model) and feed-
back effects (endogenous to the model) may well produce similar outcomes in the short
run, but lead to different transition dynamics in the long run. Ideally, we therefore would
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Figure 10. Evolution of academia assuming the population of highly edu-
cated is immediately representative of the general population, and four sets
of values for h and α.
like to derive an exogenous trend of “highly educated” which incorporates the “black tax”
and further structural factors to calibrate the model. Unfortunately our data at hand does
not allow for disentangling the endogenous feed-back effect from structural factors. To the
extent that exogenous factors have a racial bias, they will be captured by α, the feedback
parameter. Thus our value of α may be an over-estimate of the endogenous feed-back
effect.
7. Discussion
The most visible and indeed most controversial mechanism to increase the participation
of minorities in the workforce is arguably affirmative action. As a measure, it aims at a
structural change in demand. But demand is shaped also by psychological factors, and
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supply is an equally important factor when attempting to increase black participation
in academia. Moreover, there is a feedback effect between supply and demand: Ethnic
homophily on the side of white academics limits the hiring of black academics, which leads
potential black academics to decide that there are only limited opportunities for them in
academia. However, addressing those other factors will be hard, and how they will be
addressed will reflect fundamental ideological orientations.
Table 1. Factors shaping black participation in academia
Structural factors Psychological factors
Supply Pipeline of black candidates
weakened by inadequately
functioning primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary education
system
Potential black academics
perceive limited occupational
opportunity in the field and
choose other careers
Demand Affirmative action / employ-
ment equity regulations en-
courage hiring of black aca-
demics
Homophily results in white in-
cumbents preferring to hire
other white academics, rein-
forcing the status quo
The politically and economically preferred solution to the problem of an anaemic sup-
ply of black academics would be to overhaul the entire school system. Spaull (2013) still
finds fundamental differences between the 25 percent wealthier schools (largely correlated
with white schools under Apartheid) and the 75 percent poorer (almost exclusively black)
schools, to such an extent that the predictors of school success are largely different. How-
ever, the experience of the US “No Child Left Behind” strategy provides some indication
of how hard that is.
An alternative strategy to would be to optimally use the limited pipeline. Universities
have a limited ability to affect that happens at primary and secondary schools, but they
can identify and support gifted black students from undergraduate level. Indeed, some
universities are already experimenting with this strategy (Herman, 2011).
From a psychological perspective, the very presence of black academics is needed to
challenge the (often unwitting) assumptions of the typically white academics who oversee
the appointments and promotions of faculty members. Social psychology scholars (e.g.
Brewer, 1996) argue that inter-group contact triggers a series of adaptations from re-
categorisation into a shared identity to personalisation. Bertrand, Chugh and Mullainathan
(2005) argue that the presence of a black person in a decision-making context can help
“mute” the stereotyped response. In fact, Baez (2000) pointed out that committee service
by academics of colour can be seen as a strategic intervention used to redefine institutional
structures. From the perspective of university administrators, that should clearly be done,
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but guarding against the well-documented risk (e.g. Mabokela, 2002) of burdening faculty
of colour with administrative tasks without providing any academic credit or recognition.
In terms of the perceived occupational opportunity, strong black students are more likely
to see themselves as academics if there are other black people in the academic system. It
is perhaps not surprising that the racial composition of the faculty at the historically black
universities most closely mirrors the demography of South Africa — for a student at one of
those universities, black faculty role models do exist. However, the strong teaching orien-
tation of those institutions means that black scholars remain largely absent in scholarship.
South African legislation is designed to help redress past wrongs against black South
Africans. Faculty of colour from elsewhere in Africa or indeed the world do not receive
any privileged consideration for appointments. In understanding the role they can play in
universities it is important to consider how they are perceived by both black and white
South Africans. It seems likely that black South Africans may not closely identify with
them, as they may be perceived as not having suffered the kind of challenges that black
South African scholars needed to overcome. But to the extent that white South African
academics see international faculty of colour as comparable to black South Africans, they
may be able to play an important role in transformation. As universities pursue the
increasingly prominent imperative of internationalisation, black scholars from the rest of
the world may increase the prominence of black academics in the still white-dominated
South African university system.
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